From Article 5 to 360 Degrees: Expanding NATO’s Definition of Security over 75 Years—Part II
By Megan Gisclon, editor of Atlantica. Original publication dated December 2024; published by the Istanbul Policy Centre.
Women, Peace, and Security
NATO adopted United Nations Security Council (UNSC) Resolution 1325 on Women, Peace, and Security (WPS) over two decades ago, on October 31, 2000. The resolution recognizes the unique role that women play not only in conflict and combat but in all NATO domains. It works to ensure gender equality across all areas of the Alliance and is integrated across all of NATO’s core tasks, as outlined in NATO’s 2022 Strategic Concept. [25] The basis of NATO’s WPS agenda is twofold. First, the agenda recognizes that conflict has a disproportionate effect on women. Second, it recognizes that women are not only victims but also play unique roles in conflict settings. Thus, it adopts a holistic perspective of women and their roles in democratic societies.
Since the adoption of UNSC Resolution 1325, NATO has adopted nine other UNSC resolutions on WPS, expanding the agenda’s visibility within NATO. This year, NATO adopted an updated policy on Women, Peace, and Security, which was endorsed by NATO Heads of State and Government at the Washington Summit.[26] This updated policy reflects lessons learned over the past 24 years of the WPS Agenda not only in NATO member states and operations but also those learned by partners and civil society organizations.
While the WPS agenda is implemented across NATO, one of the chief ways in which the agenda is implemented is through the creation of NATO offices dedicated to the implementation of the WPS agenda, including military gender advisors and the Secretary General’s Special Representative for Women, Peace and Security. Among other programs, NATO also provides gender advisory training to member state militaries. Although NATO itself has been carrying out these programs for years, it was highlighted during the discussion that few of these programs and the WPS agenda itself have been implemented by individual member states. Thus, there is a gap between the NATO level and some member countries.
Within NATO, women make up nearly 13% of all NATO armed forces on average and 44% of international staff. Although women have been a significant part of NATO since its founding, it was highlighted during the panel discussion that women are rarely seen in NATO—a point maintained by one panelist who is currently conducting a research project on NATO’s WPS Agenda. While women have been promoted to many leadership roles within NATO, including the role of Deputy Secretary General and Assistant Secretary General for various NATO departments, NATO has yet to appoint a female Secretary General, which is by and far the most visible representation of NATO. As another example of the lack of visibility of women in NATO, the same panelist pointed out that a recently edited volume on NATO did not include any chapter on NATO’s WPS agenda or even gender issues more generally.
As the war in Ukraine has put the spotlight on women and their role in conflict, the subject of women in the war in Ukraine, a NATO partner country and aspiring member state, was taken up in the panel discussion by a prominent Ukrainian human rights defender who has been documenting Russian war crimes in Ukraine. Since the beginning of the conflict in Ukraine in 2014, Russia has been committing acts of torture, sexual violence, and extrajudicial executions of Ukrainian citizens held as prisoners of war and illegally detained civilians. While this has affected all citizens, the majority of documented cases are from women. While Ukraine has seen the massive mobilization of women over the last decade—with over 4,000 Ukrainian women in combat positions—women have been performing a myriad of roles including political, diplomatic, civil, combat, and caretaker roles as well as documenting war crimes. In addition to facing the disproportionate effects of violence, women have faced gendered issues within the Ukrainian Armed Forces such as the absence of uniforms tailored for women. Initiatives such as the Invisible Battalion,[27] which has been advocating for gender equality within the Ukrainian army since the annexation of Crimea in 2014, was brought forth in the discussion as an example of how Ukrainian women are working toward a more equal future in the armed forces. It was maintained that while major progress has been made over the last decade, more work needs to be done to achieve gender equality within Ukraine’s armed forces. As Ukraine will undoubtedly continue its struggle toward gender equality during the extent of the war, it will continue to provide best practice examples and lessons learned for other states and NATO.
Although the UNSC has continuously worked to update and improve upon the WPS agenda, both NATO and Ukraine’s adoption of the WPS agenda have been frequently criticized by feminist scholars. Many of these arguments and critiques were outlined in the panel discussion. At the center of one argument, it is maintained that because international relations, peacebuilding, and the military domain operate within male-dominated systems of hegemonic masculinity, the WPS agenda cannot break from a patriarchal system. Most recently, NATO’s heightened defense spending has also been criticized by feminist scholars, who argue that the purchase of more weapons can never benefit the role of women in conflict.
In the case of Ukraine, feminist scholars have criticized the heavy militarization of the WPS agenda, arguing that during wartime women in combat are prioritized above women’s social rights and peacekeeping. Furthermore, Ukraine has been criticized for reinforcing a form of nationalist feminism that prioritizes security and defense over the “right” feminist goals. During the panel discussion, one speaker provided an apt metaphor to illustrate the unfair criticism levied at Ukraine: if one breaks their leg while on their way to buy shoes, one generally does not continue their quest to buy shoes but instead goes to the hospital. While Ukrainian feminists had been working toward achieving gender equality and securing more social rights for women prior to the war, Ukrainians now first need to ensure their freedom from Russia in order to then continue to fight for greater social rights for women.
It was also highlighted that while Ukraine has been an active conflict zone since 2014, it has published two national action plans to implement the WPS agenda, with the second updated in light of the full-scale invasion and active conflict setting.[28] While it was conceded during the panel discussion that there is often a gap between the WPS agenda on paper and how it is implemented in practice in the field, Ukraine will prove to be a viable testing ground for how the WPS agenda can be implemented while in an active state of combat. As NATO will continue to increase its focus on the WPS agenda across all domains over the next decade, this practical experience may help prepare NATO strategies for adapting its agenda to future conflict scenarios.
Climate Security
NATO recognizes climate change as both a “crisis and a threat multiplier.”[29] Like the Women, Peace, and Security Agenda, NATO aims to integrate climate change across all its core tasks. Climate change is a part of NATO’s efforts toward building individual and collective resilience, maintaining NATO’s technological edge, its strategy for the South, crisis management and counterterrorism, and its partnership with the EU, among other areas of cooperation and operation.
While the threats stemming from climate change are viewed differently among Allied member states, with each member state facing unique threats‚ it was maintained during the panel discussion that climate change is a global problem that needs to be dealt with cooperatively on a global scale, as the threats stemming from climate change do not respect borders or territorial divides. While the UN has been leading the global effort to combat climate change through the implementation of major climate decisions at its annual Conference of the Parties (COP), NATO has expressed its desire to become the leading international organization on climate change and security. To this end, it has been increasing its efforts to combat climate change and to raise its profile in the area of climate security on the international stage. Under the leadership of former Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg, for example, NATO participated in three COP events (COP 26, 27, and 28).
NATO has been working on environmental security projects since establishing the Committee on the Challenges of Modern Society (CCMS), a predecessor of the Science for Peace and Security (SPS) Programme, in 1969. However, its work on climate change accelerated in the 2010s following the implementation of the 2010 Strategic Concept—which for the first time recognized climate change as a security challenge—and, later, the implementation of NATO’s Green Defence Framework in 2014.[30] During this period, NATO began to recognize the significant impact that armed forces have on the environment as well as the wide-ranging nature of the threats stemming from climate change across multiple domains.
NATO’s climate security efforts have been rapidly expanding in the 2020s, as the climate crisis has become far more entrenched. In 2021, NATO leaders agreed at the Brussels Summit to implement a Climate Change and Security Action Plan,[31] reinforcing the Climate Change and Security Agenda that had been endorsed by NATO foreign ministers three months prior. These plans were adopted with a view toward adapting NATO’s 360-degree approach for climate change as well as NATO’s 2030 process. The Plan also announced the first NATO Climate Change and Security Impact Assessment, which assesses NATO’s climate impact and the integration of the climate perspective into its operations on an annual basis, with the first assessment published in 2022. In 2023, Allied leaders at the Vilnius Summit moved to establish an accredited NATO Centre of Excellence for Climate Change and Security in Montreal, Canada, which opened in May 2024.
Although NATO is striving to implement clear, forward-looking plans to combat climate change with a 360-degree approach, many challenges remain in combatting climate change and determining the full scope of this issue within the security field. This sentiment was echoed during the panel discussion, in which one panelist maintained that because of the diverse threats stemming from climate change that it is difficult to conceive of a “systematic and rational way to interlink all the [NATO] hardcore security threats that emanate from climate change.” While the nexus of climate change and hard security is often not definitive, some threats are clearer than others. Today, for example, we can see a clear threat to military personnel, who are affected by operating in extreme heat or cold; military installations, which are subject to the surrounding climatic conditions; and energy infrastructure, which is vulnerable to extreme weather. It was also pointed out during the discussion that climate change has proven extremely harmful to the global economy. According to one estimate, the total damages from climate change reached USD 2.8 trillion from 2000 to 2019.[32] In the first 11 months of 2024, the United States alone experienced 24 climate incidents each costing over USD 1 billion.[33] Further, in addition to these known challenges, there is a degree of uncertainty around what the future threats stemming from climate change will look like and how they will manifest—let alone what they will cost. To this end, U.S. Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin’s comments were referenced in which he identifies climate change as an “existential” security threat.[34]
In preparing its climate security strategy, NATO must not only address today’s threats but also forecast and prepare for future threats stemming from the changing climate. Security threats such as rising sea levels and the melting ice in the Arctic, for example, will precipitate both anticipated and unanticipated security threats for the future. In the Arctic, melting ice will expose new resources and elements that can be mined for energy and technological resources. Melting sea ice may also open up new trade routes in the High Seas, where China has already planned to utilize these perspective sea lanes as part of its Polar Silk Road. Competition for access to these resources will undoubtedly further inflame geopolitical tensions in an already unstable global environment. Additionally, future scenarios such as climate-induced migration will also threaten human security and domestic stability, as well as that of supranational organization such as the EU, as nations form political decisions on migration.
The challenges pertaining to the transformation of the energy sector, including the ongoing energy transition away from fossil fuels as well as European efforts to achieve energy independence, were highlighted in the discussion as essential components of climate security for NATO. While NATO has continued to widen its climate security agenda since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, the war in Ukraine has placed increased political focus on energy security rather than climate security.[35] Germany’s decision to reignite its old coal-fired power plants (despite its nuclear energy capacity) in effort to wean itself off Russian natural gas following the latter’s fullscale invasion of Ukraine is one example in which energy security has been prioritized over climate security for geopolitical reasons. Another example that was highlighted during the discussion is that of the increasing energy resources needed for the development of AI, which will be needed to ensure the Alliance’s technological edge. Amid global efforts to reduce energy usage in face of the climate crisis, projected energy usage from AI giants such as Google and Microsoft have already increased significantly from 2023 to 2024, posing a challenge to global emissions reduction targets.[36]
Although NATO is rarely involved in the geopolitical decisions related to member states’ energy needs, NATO’s mediation efforts between Greece and Türkiye in 2020 was brought forth during the panel discussion as one example in which physical and energy security became intertwined directly within NATO in recent years. As tensions between the two NATO member states heightened due to disputes over drilling for hydrocarbon resources and exclusive economic zones (EEZ) in the Eastern Mediterranean, NATO—which in the past has been reluctant to intervene in bilateral conflicts between member states—set up a de-escalation mechanism to help prevent incidents between the two members at sea and in the air.[37] Amid the de-escalation process, Türkiye abandoned its exploratory missions in the Eastern Mediterranean and turned to its ongoing search for natural gas in the Black Sea—a mission that has largely proved successful, as was posited by one panelist. Although NATO’s effectiveness in resolving bilateral disputes between member states was widely debated at the time of the Eastern Mediterranean crisis,[38] the success of this mediation effort has proved that NATO can be an active mediator in potential energy and climate-related disputes in the future.
While NATO faces an uphill battle in responding to the future threats stemming from climate change, the Alliance’s view toward integrating a climate perspective across all tasks will undoubtedly help future-proof NATO amid the ongoing climate crisis. However, as the political consensus around climate change is in flux—with incoming U.S. President Donald Trump promising to withdraw from the UN’s Paris Climate Accords—NATO will need to develop creative ways to convince all actors to agree to decisions on climate security. Although mitigating the effects of climate change and cutting emissions are essential to a more resilient future for NATO, increased cooperation on energy security may prove more attainable in the coming years.
Conclusion
NATO’s 75th anniversary provides a valuable opportunity to reflect on its legacy as well as how it is addressing the unprecedented challenges of today. Over the last seven and a half decades, NATO has become the most successful alliance in history, largely owing to its remarkable resilience and ability to adapt to the changing global threat environment. As seen through the first section of this report, NATO has successfully leveraged its consensus-based decision-making and protected its democratic framework to continue its core mission of collective defense well beyond the Cold War. Its purpose has remained intact despite major shifts in the international order, a move toward out-of-area operations, and the reawakening of the Russian threat on its borders.
While it could have easily slipped into bipolar logic following Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, solely focusing on hard security threats from Russia, NATO has instead proven its commitment to its updated security posture. In its new Strategic Concept, NATO increased its commitment to integrating climate change, human security, and the Women, Peace and Security agenda within its core tasks and has followed through with updated policies such as the adoption of a new policy on Women, Peace, and Security and the establishment of the NATO-accredited Centre of Excellence for Climate Change and Security. However, as the global security environment continues to remain unstable and liberal democracy within the Alliance remains under threat, it is incumbent upon NATO to remain vigilant in upholding and implementing these tasks.
In the coming years, NATO should increase the visibility of projects related to dis/misinformation, climate security, and the Women, Peace, and Security agenda in order to amplify the importance of these issues across its core tasks. While during the celebration of NATO’s 75th anniversary, these issues became increasingly visible, it remains to be seen if they will remain as visible in NATO’s agenda in future when the security threats facing the Alliance become more pervasive and NATO’s Article 5 might be undermined as several future NATO heads of state have indicated their lack of full support for it.
For NATO to remain relevant and maintain its strength in future, it must not merely rest on its laurels but face the new challenges ahead with flexibility and determination.
Notes
25 NATO, “2022 Strategic Concept.”
26 “NATO Policy on Women, Peace and Security (2024),” NATO, last updated July 11, 2024, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_ texts_227578.htm.
27 Invisible Battalion Homepage, https://invisiblebattalion.org/en/home-2/
28 For more information, see “Ukraine,” 1325 NAPS, accessed December 20, 2024, https://1325naps.peacewomen.org/index.php/ukraine.
29 NATO, “2022 Strategic Concept.”
30 “Green Defence Framework,” Approved by the North Atlantic Council in February 2014, NATO, https://natolibguides.info/ld.php?content_ id=25285072.
31 “NATO Climate Change and Security Action Plan,” NATO, last updated June 14, 2021, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_ texts_185174.htm.
32 Paige Bennett, “Climate change is costing the world $16 million per hour: study,” World Economic Forum, October 12, 2023, https://www. weforum.org/stories/2023/10/climate-loss-and-damage-cost-16-millionper-hour.
33 “Overview: Billion-Dollar Weather and Climate Disasters,” National Centers for Environmental Information, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, accessed December 27, 2024, https://www.ncei.noaa. gov/access/billions/.
34 David Vergun, “Defense Secretary Calls Climate Change an Existential Threat,” DOD News, U.S. Department of Defense, April 22, 2021, https://www.defense.gov/news/news-stories/article/article/2582051/ defense-secretary-calls-climate-change-an-existential-threat.
35 Heidi Hardt and Jacqueline Burns, “NATO wants to be a leader on climate security. Here are the next steps to get there,” New Atlanticist, The Atlantic Council, August 19, 2024, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/ blogs/new-atlanticist/nato-wants-to-be-a-leader-on-climate-securityhere-are-the-next-steps-to-get-there/.
36 Dara Kerr, “AI brings soaring emissions for Google and Microsoft, a major contributor to climate change,” NPR, July 12, 2024, https://www.npr. org/2024/07/12/g-s1-9545/ai-brings-soaring-emissions-for-google-andmicrosoft-a-major-contributor-to-climate-change.
37 “Military de-confliction mechanism between Greece and Turkey established at NATO,” NATO, last updated October 1, 2020, https://www.nato. int/cps/en/natohq/news_178523.htm.
38 Judy Dempsey, “Judy Asks: Is NATO Paralyzed Over the Greece-Turkey Conflict?” Carnegie Europe, September 3, 2020, https://carnegieendowment.org/europe/strategic-europe/2020/09/judy-asks-is-nato-paralyzed-over-the-greece-turkey-conflict?lang=en.
PANEL RECORDINGS
NATO AT 75: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3NqmGtbiESs&list=PL7tbDtVxk41NSewhmzOGSutqaqMYlf1CK
DIS/MISINFORMATION: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=uRtyb3GhQ3Y&list=PL7tbDtVxk41NSewhmzOGSutqaqMYlf1CK&index=2
WOMEN, PEACE, AND SECURITY: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=AHVAlKPTZKk&list=PL7tbDtVxk41NSewhmzOGSutqaqMYlf1CK&index=3
CLIMATE SECURITY: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=q2oL_ ztnQ5I&list=PL7tbDtVxk41NSewhmzOGSutqaqMYlf1CK&index=4
