Further Implications and Examples of Ongoing Canadian Support to Ukraine
By Alexander Landry, P.Eng, PMP and Andrew D. McNaughton this article was originally published in the Royal Canadian Military Institute’s (RCMI), in November 2022.
Introduction
Not long ago now, citizens of NATO and European countries held their collective breath as missiles struck across the Polish side of the Poland-Ukraine border on the evening of November 15th. With the spotlight on the conflict in Ukraine once more, early reports indicated that Poland might seek to invoke NATO’s Article IV, while many nations, such as the United States, were quick to seek intelligence reports on the ground to analyse what many thought might bring the world to the brink once more, even if just for a moment. As investigations were ongoing on the matter, what became clear was that we would not see a triggering of collective defence this past week, and many of us let out a sigh of relief.
To this effect, it has now been nearly ten months since Russia’s illicit invasion of Ukraine began, and the conflict seems no closer to an end with winter looming. For many, conflict fatigue seems to be setting in, and the events of November 15th did not help in alleviating this feeling, if only further heightening tensions surrounding the conflict. This being said, there are many nations that continue to stand with Ukraine, renewing their commitment as of late despite a bleak world economic situation. Canada is among these nations, continuing its long-standing history of commitment to Ukraine, despite some economic and health-service-related issues back home.
Canada has demonstrated itself to be a stalwart in its support of Ukrainians, in many respects more than simply through donations of funds or training of troops. To this effect, in a previous issue of this publication, we looked specifically at future Canadian involvement with Op UNIFIER, outlining methods in which Canada could seek to work with NATO and its allies to further bolster the Security Forces of Ukraine (SFU). Now, as the crisis nears a long winter period, we will seek to outline the further implications for Canada regarding the conflict in Ukraine, mostly as a reminder of the commonly known items, but more importantly to shed light on the lesser-known initiatives existing to support Ukrainians in their time of need. Through the lenses of provision of aid, economic sanctions, energy security, and food security, we will presently provide an overview of these implications for Canadians and Ukrainians alike, further demonstrating the effects of Canada’s ongoing commitment to Ukraine.
Direct Provision of Aid
Chief among the various implications of ongoing Canadian support to Ukraine is the direct provision of assistance to the nation; one among the many allies that have rushed to its support. Since the invasion in February, Canada has contributed an amount of aid that is not inconsequential to Ukraine, summarised by the Prime Minister this month as totalling $3.9 billion. This Canadian support also carries the distinction of being altruistic, in so far as the Canadian economy is certainly not profiting off of these provisions, unlike some other states that have chosen to profit from the conflict, such as through the provision of weapons to Russia. To this effect, Canadian aid can be neatly divided into a lethal category, comprising weapons, ammunition, and the like, as well as a non-lethal, to include clothing, equipment, and funds for other projects and requirements. Moreover, although this support is needed and supported by the majority of Canadians, there are some ramifications for the armed forces that need to be considered.
Non-Lethal Aid
To fully define this category, it must be understood that it is composed of items and goods in various forms. First, Canada has provided funds for the purchase of equipment, notably cameras for surveillance drones, built by L3 Harris Technologies in Hamilton. The first donation of these cameras came in March, and according to the government there are at least 24 in use. Funds have also been used for the provision of satellite communication services, as well as satellite imagery from commercial satellite companies. Earlier this month in Bali, Prime Minister Trudeau also announced a further $500 million in aid for more of these space-based products, as well as fuel and medical supplies. This amount was recently increased during an announcement by the Minister of National Defence by another $34 million, to include additional winter gear for the SFU.
A second category that is of particular interest now to the defence sector is composed of products donated to Ukraine from the CAF’s stockpiles or suppliers. This includes personal protective equipment such as fragmentation vests, helmets, and other body armour (upwards of 1600 donated), 40,000 pieces of winter clothing, and night vision goggles. The government also reports donating around 390,000 individual rations, or MREs, all drawn from within the supply system from which the CAF primarily generates its own support. In April, eight ‘Milcots,’ or green-painted commercial vehicles were also donated, rounding out the donation of non-lethal goods in respect to actual donated equipment.
Finally, the third category here that must be underlined is the provision of logistical support, so far provided through the support of a Tactical Air Detachment in Prestwick, Scotland. As of publication, up to three of the CAF’s CC-130J Hercules aircraft are ferrying supplies from Canada across the Atlantic to Ukraine, as well as to the other Canadian operations in Eastern Europe, all in support of the conflict itself, or of NATO’s enhanced forward presence, a now direct implication within NATO’s response to Russian aggression in Ukraine.
Lethal Aid
Turning now to Canada’s provision of lethal aid, Canada’s contributions of arms and ammunition have made headlines for the past several months. Beginning in February with machine guns, pistols, carbines, sniper rifles and 1.5 million rounds to support these weapons, Canada also contributed 100 ‘Carl Gustav’ recoilless rifles, 7,500 hand grenades, and 4,500 M72 anti-tank rockets. While this is no small amount of materiel, especially when taken directly from CAF stocks, the big-ticket items donated remain the M777 howitzers and Light Armoured Vehicles (LAVs). To this effect, the M777s, four in total, were pulled out of regiments and sent overseas. In contrast, the 39 LAVs were fresh off the production line, and are in addition to the amount to be delivered to the Canadian Army. Through the summer and fall, Canada also donated in excess of 20,000 rounds for the M777, and 10 replacement barrels. In reading the reports from the war, these supplies have likely been expended, as the conflict remains heavily reliant on the use of artillery.
These facts are not to diminish Canada’s contributions, but rather to demonstrate that continued resolve will be required. What is important to note, especially regarding the lethal weapons contributions, is that this support comes directly from CAF stocks. While members of the CAF are well versed in doing more with less, caution may be needed moving forward in further support directly from CAF supply. The caveat to this would be if resupply of weapons and ammunition were secured and contracted, but this appears to not be the case. As a case in point, the Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) has made headlines recently attempting to motivate Canadian industry to place itself on a war footing, to bolster supply chains, and to increase domestic production capacity. While laudable, given that the Government has yet to declare war, there is little business sense in various corporations taking up the call. Furthermore, while it is important for the CDS in his capacity as the head of the armed forces to be seen and heard by the government and general public providing the best military advice, their words must remain in concert with the rest of the Department and the government. Without contracts for new ammunition or contracts to replace the already diminished stockpiles of the CAF, the Government of Canada is arguably missing an opportunity for a Whole of Government approach to its support of Ukraine, as well as ensuring that the CAF remains prepared for operations at home and abroad.
Human & Economic Implications
Outside the scope of the provision of various forms of aid to Ukraine, there are economic implications to consider, both for Canadians at home and for others abroad. Understanding the purpose of this paper, we will not look to tie the overall economic situation to the ongoing conflict in Ukraine, nor will we speak to the diplomatic effects of support for Ukraine or sanctions for Russia. Rather, we seek simply to outline the economic implications in which Canadians can get involved at home, while also outlining what Canada has done in response to the Russian aggression in Ukraine outside of direct support to the aggrieved nation itself. As such, this section will specifically look at Canadian domestic support, followed by the targeted sanctions applied to the responsible parties of the invasion.
Refugee Support
When it comes to the conflict, one of the main concerns as a consequence of the war itself has been the displacement of persons both within and outside of Ukraine. To this effect, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees has underlined the near eight million refugees having left the country, with more than seven million further having been internally displaced within Ukraine. Moreover, it is important to underline that, with winter fast approaching, these numbers will certainly only rise considering the heating and electricity situation internal to Ukraine at the moment given more than ten months of infrastructure degradation from the fighting. In response to this, many nations have opened their doors to Ukrainian refugees, with the majority flowing out through the border with Poland. To this effect, several nations have established refugee support centres in vicinity of the border, and this is also where many individuals have travelled to of their own volition in order to assist with the situation in any way they can.
Looking at the Canadian contribution, the government was quick to establish the Canada-Ukraine authorization for emergency travel (CUAET), which has provided Ukrainian nationals and their families temporary resident visas to travel and stay in Canada in face of the conflict. With close to 700,000 applications received, and more than 400,000 approved so far, upwards of 100,000 Ukrainians have now entered Canada as a result of this program. Many of these refugees are subsequently supported with resettlement in Canada, with the government even offering programs to Canadians for supporting Ukrainians in their time of need, both through the Canadian Immigrant Settlement Sector Alliance and the Canadian Red Cross. Further, many CAF members have reached out to their compatriots, having often served on previous iterations of Op UNIFIER with citizens of Ukraine who worked in support of the mission in logistical or language capacities; a topic that is becoming a widely praised phenomenon within the CAF community over the past many months.
Understanding that not every Canadian can necessarily afford, or logistically support, resettlement of refugees, the government took their domestic aid program a step further in offering the Ukraine Sovereignty Bond, thereby offering individual Canadians an opportunity to directly support Ukraine through a five-year, $500 million bond (denominated in Canadian dollars). To be issued in late November 2022, the debt instrument will essentially constitute a regular Canadian bond issued through participating financial institutions, with the funds subsequently provided through the International Monetary Fund’s Administered Account for Ukraine, which Canada also played a leading role in establishing. As such, it is through the provisions of such instruments that Canada seeks to provide individual commitment to the overall resolve for Ukraine in this conflict, similar to how it has previously done in the issuing of bonds during other times of crisis, such as WWII.
Targetted Sanctions
But it is not truly enough when we consider the support to the aggressed party in a conflict, especially when it is generally understood that the belligerent party bears the responsibility for the lack of legality in their actions. To this effect, the international community understands the need for punishment of such actions, if only to demonstrate at the least, the nonacceptance of such movements within the international system, and thereby deterring others from acting in kind. Although it took a moment for the international community to come together, it has generally responded to this illegal Russian action with communal condemnation of Russian aggression, followed by what have been incredibly debilitating sanctions against not only the Russian Federation itself, but also those that are members of the overall group actively supporting the invasion of Ukraine. Canada has been a participant in these actions, having imposed targeted sanctions on various entities and individuals through the Special Economic Measures Regulations relating to Russia, Belarus, and the occupied areas of Donbas in Ukraine. These sanctions have varied, from targeting individuals in the governmental, judiciary, and security sectors, to touching various organisations and institutions that support the current regime, such as within the energy and de- fence production sectors. Consequently, it is important to note that the Russian Federation has responded in kind, issuing sanctions of their own on prominent Canadians, notably even going so far as to include former commanders of Task Force UNIFIER and precluding them from visiting Russia in the future. To these authors, this could be considered ironic, as one would have to question why you would want to visit such a jingoist country in turmoil at this time anyways.
Looking at the business side of the response, many large corporations have also withdrawn their production or even sale of products within Russia, notably leaving behind their production elements altogether. In turn, this has left the Russian Federation generally scrambling to find domestic producers to fill the voids, as well as to attempt to stabilise an economy that initially took a plunge following the initial mobilisation in February. To this effect, although it seems that the market has relatively steadied itself since then, experts are quick to indicate that the general theme sees Russia set back some forty years in terms of production, with sanctions only further crippling the nation’s ability to produce weapons or sell its energy products. The former topic is likely where countries such as North Korea and Iran have stepped in to profit off of the conflict in supposed provision of arms to Russia; the latter topic will be dealt with specifically further in this paper. What is certain is that Russian capital markets now face extreme difficulties, especially as they have been disconnected from the Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunication (SWIFT) systems.
International Resource Implications
The fact remains that the conflict has ramifications on the international community outside of those previously identified. The pain and suffering of the Ukrainian people, and the threatened sovereignty of the country notwithstanding, this section will look at some of the international resource and supply implications stemming from the conflict, namely the energy and food security situations. These are both topics that have been prominent in the media since the beginning of the summer, and both are likely to come to a head in the next few months with the arrival of winter in Europe and Ukraine.
Energy Security
The first major concern stemming from the conflict is that of energy security, mostly considering the fact that Russia has been a major provider of oil and gas for Europe since the latter half of the last century. To this effect, prior to the conflict, Russian gas exports were approximately 40% of the totality consumed in the European Union. Once the invasion began, it became clear that this would be a major point of contention amongst the allies, particularly considering the heavier reliance on Russian exports by some nations vice others. With Russia subsequently leveraging the distribution of energy for political control by trying to sow dissonance between the allies, Europe has been forced to seek alternatives in energy provisions. Now, as the heating season looms for Europe, it has become clear that the European energy landscape has forever changed, as this issue can no longer be one that is linked to the conclusion of the conflict.
Speaking briefly to the Canadian implications regarding energy security as a result of the conflict, it has been widely suggested that Canada could (and should) assist with the woes facing Europe, with many pundits pointing to Canada’s capacity to fill the needs with liquefied natural gas (LNG) reserves of its own. As the world’s fifth-largest producer of LNG, the fact of the matter is that, although it may have the capacity, the infrastructure simply does not exist at this time to support the immediate needs leading into the winter of 2022. Understanding that the majority of reserves reside in Alberta, Canada’s infrastructure is likely at least three years away from operational capability in terms of supplying Europe. Moreover, with an inability to supply current needs before 2025, coupled with climate commitments, the reality is that Canadian LNG production risks being orphaned should it even be ramped up at all.
That said, what this does provide for Canada is an opportunity to reorient its energy strategy, while also maintaining a high-level dialogue with Europe on this critical subject. With the dialogue officially established as part of the EU-Canada Summit in 2014, the recent visit from German Chancellor Olaf Scholz underlined a renewed commitment to bilateral discussion, which Canada should look to seize upon moving forward. While investments into LNG will not address the European need for this coming winter, or even the next, the reality remains that the Russia-Europe energy landscape is forever changed, thus offering Canada an opportunity to foster its energy sector, while simultaneously strengthening ties with its European allies.
Food Security
The other major international concern that has stemmed from the war in Ukraine has been that of food (in)security. Specifically, one of the major sources driving global inflation is the effects the war has had on exports of Ukrainian grain. While multi-factored in Ukraine, its effects are felt throughout the world, most acutely in those nations and areas that already experience food insecurity. Ukraine is known as “the breadbasket” for much of the world, notably referring to its massive production of grain that obviously constitutes the primary ingredient in bread. To provide some context, and to understand the extent of the war’s reach, here are some examples from the World Economic Forum that demonstrate Ukraine’s importance to the global food market: Sunflower Oil, $6.4 billion or 46% of global exports; Corn, $5.9 billion or 12% of global exports; and Wheat, $5.1 billion or 9% of global exports. Notably, most of these exports are to India, China, the Middle East, and the European Union. Together with Russia, Ukraine provides over half of the grain supply for the World Food Program, which provides many of the world’s most vulnerable populations.
This critical disruption to the global supply chain is the result of several conflict-related actions. First, the war itself has disrupted the sowing and harvesting of the crops themselves, whether from conflict taking place on these lands in the East of Ukraine, or the diversion of manpower to the war effort. Second, Ukraine exports 75% of its agri-food products through its Black Sea ports. This area has been a region of conflict as well, from armed attacks on naval units of both sides, sea mining of ports, and the Russian blockade of shipments. This blockade has been resolved since July with a UN agreement between the belligerents, the UN, and Turkiye (which controls the Bosphorus and therefore the link to the rest of the world’s sea lanes), allowing agri-food products from both Ukraine and Russia to reach the market. However, there is also a backlog of products due to export disruption, and Canada and its farmers have donated aid and expertise to set up storage facilities, as well as moving agri-food products to market by other channels. The storage solution, under the auspices of the Food and Agriculture Organization of the UN (FAO), aims to store 2.4 million tonnes of grain for the next two years, complementing a donation by Japan to cover an additional 1 million tonnes. Ideally, the plan seeks to provide storage solutions for 4.07 million tonnes, or a quarter of the storage deficit caused by damage to storage facilities by the conflict, or storage now under Russian occupation, or those already filled with harvests from 2021 and the first half of 2022.
Conclusion
Overall, it is clear that Europe’s first war since WWII has many ramifications, including some that will change the geopolitical landscape for decades to come. It is clear that along with the international community, Canada has demonstrated itself as a stalwart and staunch supporter of Ukraine right from the beginning of the conflict. Through the lenses of aid provision and support to Ukraine, targeted sanctions, and overall condemnation of Russia’s actions, we have sought to outline the implications for the Canadian economy, as well as human factors, and food and energy security.
With Prime Minister Trudeau’s G20 conference announcement that Canada will be extending its training mission in Ukraine, including additional troops, it remains clear that Canada is committed to a free and peaceful Ukraine. Ukrainian President Volodomyr Zelenskyy recognizes this fact, having called upon Canada specifically at the Halifax International Security Forum, to spearhead peace initiatives between Kyiv and Moscow moving forward. With the conflict now entering a crucial and uncertain phase, Canada can take advantage of a position of leadership in such a discourse, while still considering the implications and ramifications of the conflict at home.
ABOUT THE AUTHORS
Alexander Landry, P.Eng, PMP is a 2016 graduate of the Royal Military College with a B.Eng. in Chemical Engineering, and the Valedictorian of the University of Fredericton’s Class of 2020, having graduated with an MBA specializing in Global Leadership. He currently serves as a staff officer at NATO Allied Land Command. Previously having served on an expeditionary mission in Ukraine towards enhanced NATO interoperability, he has also deployed domestically within Canada for disaster assistance.
Andrew D. McNaughton is a 2015 graduate of the Royal Military College with a BA in Military and Strategic Studies, and a 2020 graduate of King’s College London with a MA in War Studies. He currently serves as a CH-147 Chinook pilot at 450 Tactical Helicopter Squadron in Petawawa, ON, and has deployed air operations experience with the United Nations Mission in South Sudan.