A Clash of Doctrines: A Legal and Historical Analysis of the Cyprus Problem
Original Publication: Onur Anamur, ‘A Clash of Doctrines: A Legal and Historical Analysis of the Cyprus Problem’, Transatlantic Policy Quarterly (13 December 2025).
Discourse about the Cyprus question seems puzzling. Sometimes Cyprus will be mentioned as Turkey’s occupation of a European Union member state, something which to the uninformed ear might be so shocking as to be scarcely believable*[1]. At other times, Cyprus seems mentioned only in passing, the most frozen of frozen conflicts*[2] and the most insignificant of global disputes*[3]. On other occasions, it seems to be the epitome of complicated and intractable global problems*[4].
This paper provides a brief history of the conflict and a cursory analysis of the legal questions. The latter in practice serves as a defense of Turkey, the party most commonly accused. The paper concludes that the facts of the Cyprus question in themselves are not so difficult, and the problems not so intractable; rather, it is doctrinal standpoints vis-à-vis simple but fundamental and essential questions of international law which generate divergent views. Hopefully, through this exercise, readers will be better able to adjudge themselves the merits of the arguments of the parties of the Cyprus problem and, what is more, be better able to contextualize the actions and motives of actors in the Eastern Mediterranean.
Origins
The Cyprus problem has been going on for a while. It dates to before the island’s independence when it was a British Crown Colony. After the Second World War, a popular movement for independence from Britain developed*[5]. Spearheaded by the Greek Cypriot majority, it mainly sought unification with Greece, ‘enosis’.[6] The Turkish Cypriot minority, whose presence dated to Ottoman times, did not want to join Greece. Some Turkish Cypriots thought Cyprus should go to Turkey. After all, if Greece had gotten the formerly Italian Dodecanese in the Aegean after the Second World War, why should not Turkey get Cyprus? Others, it might be thought more realistically given the demography, hoped for the partition of the island between Greeks and Turks or the continuation of British rule. Yet maybe the rather radical stances for partition or joining Turkey, however unrealistic in themselves, were shrewd negotiating positions; they would have rendered the compromise to come better for Turkish Cypriots—at least so thought the Turkish Cypriot leader Rauf Denktaş in hindsight.
There was agitation for independence ever since about 1950; and, over time, the question of independence grew contentious and its advocates radical. By 1955, the Greek paramilitary EOKA (Ethnike Organosis Kyprion Agoniston: The National Organization of Cypriot Fighters) started waging an armed struggle for independence from Britain and union for Greece. The British used Turkish Cypriot troops against this movement, exacerbating tensions. Turkish Cypriots formed their own paramilitaries in response to EOKA. The TMT (Turkish Resistance Organization) was to become the principal one.
The tribalism is striking. The word for ‘national’ in ‘EOKA’, ethnike’ has, unsurprisingly, an ethnic connotation. A popular EOKA song calls directly for a repeat of 1821, the year of the War of Greek Independence from the Ottoman Empire—which was accompanied by the ethnic cleansing of Turkish communities[1] iqSiybc[7]. As for the TMT, the word for ‘resistance’ in ‘TMT’ also means ‘response’ or ‘counteroperation’, indicating that it was very much an organization formed against the Greeks. Indeed, in common parlance, these champions of a rather secular community were termed mücahitler (mujahideen).
With the British increasingly unwilling to keep onto their colony in the face of Greek irredentism and heightened interethnic tensions on the island, the Cypriot question came to interest not just Cypriots and the United Kingdom but Greece and Turkey, whose peoples felt an interest in their ethnic kin on the island.
The New Cypriot Republic
Diplomacy about the question of Cyprus’ future status also turned out very disputatious. Yet owing in part to the collegiality of Zorlu and Averoff[8], the Turkish and Greek foreign ministers of the time, a compromise was wrought out in the London and Zurich Agreements which spelled out the future status of the island. Cypriots were consulted about the arrangements devised but had no authorship over them. In accordance with these agreements, Cyprus became independent in 1960 as a unitary but bicommunal republic[2] 1[9]. Its constitution was complex and singularly consociationalist. Offices were divided up: parliamentarians elected by communal ballot, a 7:3 ratio of Greeks to Turks in the Council of Ministers, a Greek president, a Turkish vice-president... There was also a complicated system of legislative voting: parliament was mostly to act by simple majority, but fiscal matters could require both a majority of Turkish and of Greek parliamentarians. At the same time, both the vice-president and president were given vetoes. These were absolute when it came to foreign affairs, defense, and internal security. Finally, Turkey, Britain, and Greece guaranteed these arrangements under a Treaty of Guarantee[3] pdf[10] and were given the right to intervene if the republic’s constitution ever broke down. This last would later become very important.
Yet in 1963, three years after independence, troubles broke out on the island. Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot politicians had been wrangling about the status of municipalities: were there to be separate Turkish and Greek municipalities—as the Turks wanted—or not—as the Greeks did? Amid this political dispute, President Makarios—who in addition to being president was the head of the island’s Orthodox Church and so the traditional ethnarch of the Greek Cypriots—announced a 13-point amendment proposal of the constitution, whose net effect would been to curtail the role of vetoes and the number of reserved offices[11]. This proposal occasioned a protest by Turkish Cypriots in Nicosia, which infamously descended into violence.
Greek Majority Rule 1963–74
In the wake of that violence, the constitutional order collapsed. Consociationalism broke down: Turkish Cypriot officials left government, due, it seems, both to efforts by Greek hardliners to exclude them and pressure from Turkish Cypriot hardliners who encouraged political secession. Indeed, since this point no government based in the south has effectively represented Turkish Cypriots or been, at large, regarded as legitimate by them. In the same crisis, yet another institution of state, the Cypriot Army also collapsed. The Greeks formed a new National Guard and there was much pan-nationalist paramilitarism. Turkish Cypriots, on their part, reactivated the TMT. At the same time, this constitutional crisis was accompanied by ethnic conflict, marked by atrocities. Around the same time, in December, the aftermath of an incident where a Greek Cypriot police officer stopped a Turkish taxi driver, armed conflict broke out throughout the island—known as Bloody Christmas.
Intercommunal violence continued into 1964, when some semblance of law and order was restored. That same year the UN’s still ongoing peacekeeping mission to Cyprus began. Yet, Cyprus had begun accruing characteristics of Palestine today[12]. There formed Turkish Cypriot enclaves*[13]. These were effectively self-governing but surrounded by government-controlled territory, isolated from both each other and—without access to the sea—the wider world. Meanwhile, Greek pan-nationalist paramilitaries roamed the country. It is also alleged that Turkish Cypriots were encouraged to emigrate after the constitutional crisis till the Turkish invasion of the island in 1974. In the period leading up to that event, Turkey, infuriated, was to make repeated demands for Turkish Cypriots to have access to the sea. It also threatened repeatedly to intervene, but found occasion after occasion that, diplomatically or militarily, it best not. In this same period, occasional outbursts of violence continued. Indeed, these scandals were to sour attitudes toward the Greek minority in Turkey itself.
Turkish Cypriots had become politically, and often physically, marginalized.[14] Turkish intervention appeared politically impossible. For Turkish Cypriots, the government was now unconstitutional. Yet the Cypriot government continued to be regarded as legitimate internationally. Significantly, the very dispatch of peacekeepers confirmed it. Sending peacekeepers requires the consent of the government of the country to which the peacekeeping mission is being sent. By getting the permission of the government in Nicosia to send peacekeepers, the UN implicitly recognized that government’s legitimacy. It continues to recognize the very same administration to this day. Turks, on the other hand, to this day will not call what the world calls the Republic of Cyprus the Republic of Cyprus but the Greek Administration of South Cyprus; in their view, that republic’s existence was predicated on its observance of the constitution of 1960 and that republic collapsed back in 1963.
The Invasion
Prelude
On the whole, it seemed as if the Greek pan-nationalists had all but won. All it seemed there was to do was to get the island to petition for annexation to Greece, enosis. International negotiations revolved around somehow getting Turkey’s consent thereto. Yet Turkey desisted. There was a diplomatic impasse. The pan-nationalists were frustrated with this impasse. They were also dismayed by Makarios, who, now the president of an independent country, did not seem keen to proceed with enosis.
By the 1970s, tensions rose. In 1967, Greece had a nationalist coup; the incoming government of colonels were quite keen on enosis. In 1971, EOKA, which had disbanded after independence, formed again as EOKA-B. Meanwhile the Greek Cypriot National Guard acquired Greek officers. Yet, it seems due to both diplomatic limitations and the reticence of President Makarios, Cyprus still did not join Greece.
Things finally came to a head in 1974. In February, EOKA’s leader, Grivas died. Both the National Guard and EOKA-B seemed to increasingly come under the control of Dimitrios Ioannidis, a member of the governing Greek junta in Athens and a hardliner who seemed determined to proceed with enosis. EOKA-B started to carry out attacks. There were multiple assassination attempts on Makarios*[15].
Finally, on July 2nd, 1974, in view of all this, Makarios wrote a letter demanding the withdrawal of all Greek officers in 19 days. It was now critical: Athens would lose the means to force enosis. Athens, unable to dissuade Makarios, there was a military coup by the National Guard and EOKA-B. Makarios fled. The Greek officer Nikos Sampson, a hardline[16] and militant figure, came to power[17].
The Act
This appalled Turkey. They were reminiscent of what had happened about 70 years earlier on Crete: the Muslims had been marginalized and then a Greek nationalist government had joined Greece, proceeded by a Muslim exodus from the island[18]. Turkey demanded, among other things: the removal of Nikos Sampson and 650 Greek officers from the Cypriot National Guard, access to the sea for Turkish Cypriots and the admission of Turkish troops to protect them. Turkey invoked the Treaty of Guarantee and tried to co-opt Britain. In this, it also failed: Britain forbade Turkey from using its bases to intervene.
In view of these failures, on July 20th, 1974, Turkey invaded unilaterally, using its right as a guarantor power. It seemed unbelievable that Turkey had actually and finally invaded*[19]. Last-ditch American attempts to offset a Turkish invasion had failed. Indeed, the Turkish Prime Minister Ecevit had been adamant before Sisco, Henry Kissinger’s special envoy, that Turkey would do things ‘its way’ this time*[20]. Having failed in Turkey, he went to Athens, to now dissuade the Greeks from intervention. It must be remembered that from the American perspective what was important was not so much Cyprus itself but maintaining the unity of NATO Allies.
On the day of Turkey’s invasion, the UN Security Council passed Resolution 353*[21]. It enjoined the parties to enter negotiations and all foreign military personnel to withdraw from the island. This was an almost impossible ask of Turkey, Turkish troops were just in the act of establishing a bridgehead—a retreat now was militarily unworkable. Reading the fine print, however, the resolution itself was illusory. The resolution excepted those troops in Cyprus under the authority of an international agreement: Turkish troops were there under the authority of an international agreement, the Treaty of Guarantee. … One feels one must read this as part of the efforts by the Americans to dissuade everybody from everything while antagonizing nobody—an objective shared by the Soviets, for their part.
A ceasefire finally went through on the 22nd. By then, Turkish troops managed to take control of a path between the northern port of Kyrenia and the capital Nicosia, amounting to three percent of the island. On July 23rd, the Greek junta collapsed due to events in Cyprus. The moderate Constantine Karamanlis, who as it turned out would not take Greece to war for Cyprus, came in as the new prime minister. On Cyprus itself, Sampson also fell and was replaced by the more presentable Clerides, a decorated former Royal Air Force Pilot. Clerides was also a member of EOKA, but however for defending EOKA militants in court rather than taking part in attacks himself. Meanwhile the Turkish enclaves in Larnaca and Limassol fell to the Greeks; there was atrocity.
In accordance with the UN Security Council Resolution, a conference of the guarantor powers was convened in Geneva. There it was declared that Turkish forces were not to expand their zone of occupation, Greeks were to vacate Turkish enclaves, and a second conference was to be held in Geneva to restore peace and constitutional government. Greece, now a democracy, began to enjoy more international support.
Until the second conference, the Turks shored up their forces, and the Greeks constructed the Troodos line to stop them. The second conference met on August 14th. There Turkey dropped its demand for a federation, preferred by the Turkish Cypriot leadership; it instead proposed a cantonal arrangement, with a Turkish entity in the north with access to the sea, and an internal population transfer. Turkish Foreign Minister Turan Gunes demanded that the Greeks immediately accept these demands; Clerides, who replaced Sampson, desisted and demanded time to consider them. Turkey would not give time. The Turkish Foreign Minister, Turan Gunes, sent the coded instruction to Ankara: ‘let Ayşe go on vacation’. Ostensibly referring to his daughter Ayşe, it meant that the Turkish government had not gotten what it wanted out of negotiations: the Turkish army should resort to arms. The second invasion began on August 14th. Turkish forces reached the beleaguered enclaves of Limnities and Lefka to the west, and they burst over the northeastern quarter of the island, going all the way to and capturing Famagusta. When the advance stopped, the Turks had captured about 37% of the island.
Turkish villages welcomed the troops. Greek villages, by and large, fled, amounting to an exodus of up to around 160,000 people[22]. Turkish authorities interdicted the return of Greek refugees. Ecevit gave the need for space for Turkish refugees as an express reason for this*[23]. It was assumed that the refugees would be able to return to their homes when the settlement came—but as will be seen, that settlement still has not come. The question of refugees is also very substantive and connected to matters of international law but, for reasons of scope, is not treated in this paper.
Negotiations After the Invasion
After the invasion, Turkey reiterated its proposal of a federal solution, which Greek Cypriots came to accept in 1977. Thereafter the focus of the debate became whether the two federal entities would be explicitly Turkish and Greek, as the Turks wanted; or merely entities where one ethnicity predominated, as the Greeks preferred. In 1979 an agreement was signed stating that a bizonal federation would be the solution.
Yet just as Greek Cypriots on the island were growing more amenable to Turkish demands, the international situation was growing unfavorable for Turkey. The matter of displaced Greeks from the North, the influx of Turkish mainlanders onto the island, and Clerides’ call for the demilitarization of the island—all these factors came to portray the Turks as the intransigent party. From 1978–1980, the European Community froze aid to Turkey. As for the US, it placed an arms embargo on Turkey between 1975 and 1978—removed only after strong lobbying by the Carter Administration.
These tensions came to a head in May 1983, when the UN General Assembly passed Resolution 37/253*[24]. It reaffirmed the sovereignty, independence, and territorial integrity of Cyprus, and called for the withdrawal of all foreign troops. This was a defeat for the Turkish Cypriot leadership. For Denktaş, the advent of Turkish troops had been the precondition of the liberation of Turkish Cypriots*[25]. Moreover, the reaffirmation of sovereignty, independence, and integrity of Cyprus legitimized the government in the South. Negotiations with the Greek Cypriots stalled. On 15 November 1983, the Turkish Cypriots declared independence as the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC).
How wise was this? Security Council Resolution 541[26] condemned the move, as did Resolution 550*[27], adopted in 1984. The northern republic has gone unrecognized to this day. According to Professor James Ker-Lindsay, the declaration of independence was a critical mistake*[28]. Yet from a Turkish Cypriot perspective, certain things must be kept in mind. The period of 1963–74 was fresh in memory. One hardly imagines the Turkish Cypriot leadership would have been willing to place their new statelet at the mercy of the National Guard. At the same time, they might not have viewed the continuation of Turkish military protection as guaranteed. Turkey had already been sanctioned once before. The military government in Ankara was close to the US, but Turkey was re-transitioning to democracy. Domestic turmoil surely raised doubts about whether Turkish military presence—the ultimate guarantor of the Turkish Cypriot statelet—would continue. Furthermore, how would the new democratic Turkish government fare with the international community? How would that government withstand pressure—and as seen from what happened a few months before—was now from the Security Council itself? Perhaps the Turkish Cypriot leadership wanted to guarantee Turkey’s commitment to the island by declaring statehood and having Turkey recognize it.
The fact that talks resumed in 1984 provides further evidence for seeing Turkish Cypriot independence as a precautionary act. In those talks, it was set out that Cyprus would become a bicommunal federation, but that Turkish Cypriots would surrender some territory and foreign troops would leave the island. It is notable that Denktaş agreed to the last. In August 1984 the leaders met face-to-face. Observers thought these meetings could be conclusive. Yet the Greek Cypriot leader Kyprianou—Makarios having died and been replaced by his foreign minister—got cold feet[29]. Kyprianou faced hardline domestic opposition and was concerned about legitimizing 1974 and recognizing the Turkish sector as an equal entity. As for Denktaş, he would not agree to any settlement where Turkish forces withdrew without federalism being set in stone. Talks broke down.
Hereafter the talks fell into the familiar, still-continuing pattern:
A proposal for a bicommunal federation.
The Greek side conditioning this on:
a. the superiority of the Greek Cypriot–dominated federal government, especially in law.
b. the withdrawal of Turkish forces and safeguards against future intervention.
c. a settlement for the displaced persons of 1974.
d. some resolution concerning the Turks who settled in the North after 1974.The Turkish side playing hardball and refusing concessions in response to Greek attempts to eliminate Turkish troops and ensure federal dominance.
This became the pattern shaping all subsequent negotiations, including the Annan Plan referendum of 2004. Perhaps compromise might have succeeded, had it not been for the Europeanization of the problem. The European project has not solved the Cyprus issue; if anything, it has exacerbated it. The events of 1983 show that the warmer regard the international community had for the South may well have been one reason why the Turkish Cypriot leadership opted for secession. Europeanization intensified that dynamic. After 1985, international sympathy tilted further toward the South. In 1990, when the South applied for admission to the European Community, Turkish Cypriots were furious, but the EC welcomed the application. In 1994, the Community agreed that Cyprus was to become a member-state.
In one sense, arguably the Turkish Cypriot leadership bears some responsibility for their growing diplomatic disfavor: Denktaş was a hard-nosed negotiator—indeed, after the EU referendum, he hardened his position in favor of a confederal solution. Yet this disfavor also reflected a broader trend of Greek diplomatic outperformance in this period of history. Greece became a stable, democratic member of the European Community. Turkey remained outside, endured at least one coup, and faced a bloody insurgency.
The last great attempt at resolution, the Annan Plan, was very much in-between the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot positions: a loose federation. It would also have addressed the issue of Greek property in the North. But Greek Cypriots rejected it. Why? The same concerns—continued Turkish military presence and the need to ensure federal dominance—were there. Another, seldom mentioned, factor was EU membership itself. Once Cyprus joined the EU, the states of Europe, previously mediators, would find themselves compelled to favor the Greek Cypriot side as a fellow member-state. This has indeed been the outcome. Today, while Britain limits its concern to its bases and other powers, like China and the US, avoid involvement, Europe must support the South. This does not give Nicosia much incentive to compromise. Meanwhile, Turkey’s EU accession process is frozen, which gives Ankara little incentive to negotiate. So, the problem continues.
Throughout the Cyprus problem, there have been arguments about legality and illegality. Greek Cypriots have claimed that Turkey’s role in the problem has been outrageous. They have also claimed that the secession of the North is illegal. It is useful to evaluate Turkey’s obligations toward Cyprus, principally spelled out in the Treaty of Guarantee, and then the question of secession—a broader question which requires the discussion of international law more broadly and member states’ commitments to the UN.
Turkey’s Obligations to Cyprus per the Treaty of Guarantee
States are not allowed to interfere in each other’s affairs. So, generally, third parties are not allowed to interfere with attempts at secession in another country—indeed the question arises of when trade and engagement with a statelet constitutes supporting rebellion in another state and when it constitutes simply the recognition of a new state. However, nder the Treaty of Guarantee, Turkey had expressly given the right to invade, if that was required to uphold the Cypriot constitution. A coup is by definition an unconstitutional act. So, the question of what might or might not be illegal is not the fact of the invasion itself, but its manner, purpose, or consequence.
Relevant provisions of the treaty are*[30]:
Article I:
“The Republic of Cyprus undertakes to ensure the maintenance of its independence, territorial integrity and security, as well as respect for its Constitution. It undertakes not to participate, in whole or in part, in any political or economic union with any State whatsoever. It accordingly declares prohibited any activity likely to promote, directly or indirectly, either union with any other State or partition of the Island.”
Article II:
“Greece, Turkey and the United Kingdom likewise undertake to prohibit, so far as concerns them, any activity aimed at promoting, directly or indirectly, either union of Cyprus with any other State or partition of the Island.”
Article IV :
“In the event of a breach of the provisions of the present Treaty, Greece, Turkey and the United Kingdom undertake to consult together with respect to the representations or measures necessary to ensure observance of those provisions. In so far as common or concerted action may not prove possible, each of the three guaranteeing Powers reserves the right to take action with the sole aim of re-establishing the state of affairs created by the present Treaty.”
At first glance, it might seem that Turkey’s doings were illegal; the treaty guarantees Cyprus’ independence, integrity, and security. Yet one must guard distinctions in international law, even if doing so seems pedantic.
Turkey’s actions did not undermine the independence island, for Cyprus did not join any other country. Turkey’s actions were not about making the island insecure either; they were about ensuring the security of Turkish Cypriots. What Turkey’s actions did undermine was the integrity of the island.
Yet in 1974, Turkey did not invade Cyprus with the aim of establishing a separate Turkish state—had it done so that would have indeed violated the treaty—; the declaration of independence occurred in 1983, during an election period in Turkey, and the Turkish government was not directly responsible for it.
So what Turkey really did by invading the island and then recognizing the north’s independence was violate the sovereignty of the government in Nicosia. Yet it is argued here that Turkey— beyond what was required it per the United Nations —was under no obligation to pay special respect to the sovereignty of the Nicosia government. There is much overlap between the concept of sovereignty on one hand, and those of independence, integrity, and security, on the other. Yet they are still distinct concepts. The following hypothetical should make things clear.
Suppose Cyprus had amended its constitution in 1962 to vest sovereignty in cantonal governments, but the central executive had remained intact and protested against the change and had not recognized it. In that case, the guarantors would still have been obliged not to annex the island, not to partition it, and not to allow foreign invasion; but they would not have been bound to support the central government over the cantons.
Restoring the State of Affairs of 1960
Of course, it may be argued that Turkey’s intervention was still wrongful, since the purpose of Turkey’s intervention should have been, as mentioned in the treaty, to reestablish the ‘state of affairs’ of 1960, not to forcibly impose federalism on the island. This is an interesting discussion. Finding a conclusive answer to it is too great a task for the scope of this paper. But a Turkish response might go like this:
The ‘state of affairs’ of 1960 had broken down, and despite Turkey’s diplomatic interventions with a view to its restoration, had precipitated in such disorder that it had resulted in a coup. That insecurity had been especially hazardous for Turkish Cypriots. It could not have set out to reestablish the state of affairs of 1960 without compromising another aim set out in the treaty, that of security.
Even if Turkey should have had as its aim as the restoration of that constitutional framework, Greek Cypriots, neither before nor after the invasion, accepted going back to it even though Turkey had invaded the island. In that case, Turkey could do two things: Turkey could insist on other provisions that would obviate them, i.e. federalism; or it could conquer the rest of the island and reimpose the order of 1960 by force.
That last option does however seem to be the most textualist interpretation available—and it is amusing to think that perhaps the most lawful thing Turkey today might do is unrecognize the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus and invade the rest of the island to reimpose the state of 1960. Yet that is a solution nobody seems to have wanted very much, then or now. As such, all Turkey could have done without embarking on a further military operation—which it was not obliged to do—would have been to wait until the Cypriots either accepted federalism or a return to the constitutional arrangements of 1960. Yet before either of those happened, the North declared independence. Only Turkey—and for a brief time right after the declaration of independence, Pakistan—recognized it. Were they wrong to do so?
Again, the Treaty of Guarantee does state that Turkey and Greece were not to promote the partition of Cyprus, but does recognition of partition once it has in fact happened—in this case by a unilateral declaration of independence, does that equal to promotion of it?
A Turk might argue that practical aid to Turkish Cypriots and the government under which they in fact live do not necessarily mean the same thing as the encouragement of partition. Turkey consistently supported negotiations for reunification—at least until more recent years, when the meaning of “reunification” has become more qualified. Of course, supporting the north as Turkey did may very well be a violation of the spirit of the agreement. But international law is contractual; it may be well argued that the government of Cyprus itself and Greece broke the treaty’s spirit before 1974.
Anyhow, the substantiveness of recognition and the circumstances of its permissibility and impermissibility are debated among scholars of international law. To have a glimpse of this debate, one must depart from the Treaty of Guarantee and go on to discuss recognition within the strictures of the UN and the general corpus of international law.
Turkey’s Obligations to Cyprus per the UN Charter
At first glance, it might appear that Turkey is in the wrong, whatever the minutiae of the Treaty of Guarantee: the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus was declared legally invalid by UN, be it the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice, the binding Security Council resolutions, or the non-binding General Assembly resolutions. This carries great weight in international law; Article 103[4] text[31] of the UN Charter obliges states to treat Charter commitments as overriding all other obligations. Moreover, Article 53(1) of the same Charter obliges that regional arrangements, like the Treaty of Guarantee[32], be executed with the authorization of the Security Council. The charter does provide some ground for the UN to make proclamations.
Article 39 of the charter states[5] text[33]:
“The Security Council shall determine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression and shall make recommendations, or decide what measures shall be taken in accordance with Articles 41 and 42 to maintain or restore international peace and security.”
Article 41 sets out non-military measures, while Article 42 authorizes military action if these fail.
Yet things are not so straightforward.
Firstly, the fact of state sovereignty means that international agreements cannot be interpreted like domestic legislation. Treaties are political, which means, in practice, contractual documents. Countries might not observe them when others are not. It also means that they may accept principles of international law in general but reject the legality of rulings. This is essentially what a diplomatic disagreement is. One might think of it as agreeing with the constitution but disagreeing with a judicial decision made under it. This is not something that happens in domestic law—in fact a citizen is often more concerned about the legal decision made than the constitutional framework it is made under. Yet, states are different; this is a dispute pertinent alone to bodies with legal personality under international law. The final manifestation of the conditional and political nature of international law is the fact that enforcement of UN decisions are expressly political, left to the Security Council.[6] text[34]
In this case, as relates to the Cyprus problem, states might be obliged to heed the Security Council; but, likewise, by the same charter, “Security Council shall act in accordance with the Purposes and Principles of the United Nations.” One of these principles is the recognition of regional arrangements, such as the Treaty of Guarantee and the other London-Zurich agreements.*[35] These treaties were deposited with the UN and so have legal force. The UN Security Council must act in their light.
Secondly, the very measures the UN Security Council may undertake, those listed in Article 41; severing diplomatic relations, imposing blockades…; do not include recognition or non-recognition. Recognition is an act of political consideration; consideration alone can scarcely be treated as a threat to peace or security.*[36]
Thirdly, a general point: to empower the Security Council as an unaccountable arbiter of which states may or may not be recognized risks contradicting the principle of self-determination, which is also enshrined in the Charter. One might ask: when did the world’s oppressed consent to have their legitimate aspirations dismissed by single decisions of the Security Council, perhaps influenced by the very rulers they oppose? When did free peoples agree to uphold every authoritarian regime for the sake of stability, simply at the Council’s behest?
One must therefore draw the conclusion, however contentious, that the letter of the law does prompt the conclusion that there is no express reason in international law to regard the UN Security Council as being able to rule on the recognition or non-recognition of a state.
This leaves another question though: Do states have a duty not to recognize acts of secession, not by the writ of some authority, but by the substance of international law itself?
Unilateral secession is regarded with some disfavor*[37]. Yet a wholesale restriction thereof is not firmly rooted in international law, as the International Court of Justice’s advisory opinion on Kosovo in 2010 underlines.*[38] However, it is generally accepted that independence movements are invalid if they are not genuine but imposed by a foreign power. This principle underpinned the Stimson Doctrine of 1932, when the United States refused to recognize Manchukuo, a state created after Japan’s occupation of Manchuria and often considered its puppet. At the time, Manchuria was over 90% ethnic Han Chinese and there was no genuine Manchu independence movement. Independence was imposed entirely from without.
The case of Northern Cyprus bears some similarity to the case of Manchukuo: both declarations of independence occurred under the occupation of the army of a third power. But hereafter the cases diverge. Unlike Manchuria, Northern Cyprus had an established political leadership and a national movement that had long advocated autonomy and secession. The declaration of 1983 occurred during political paralysis in Turkey and cannot be shown to have been orchestrated by Ankara. Turkey provided the shield, but the initiative was Cypriot.
Was Turkey in the wrong to even provide a shield? Some commentators might respond affirmatively, as did the International Court of Justice in its advisory opinion on Cyprus. Yet the very possibility that Turkey invade and provide a shield for Turkish Cypriots was a measure foreseen and expressly permitted in the Treaty of Guarantee. Turkey was expressly permitted to provide a shield. So strictly speaking, there is no prohibition of recognition either.
Conclusions
The Cyprus problem has had many turns and twists, although the aspirations and the concerns of the relevant parties have remained more or less constant—the major change is that Greek Cypriots today may still want a Greek Cyprus, that is one where they predominate, but they should rather enjoy the benefits of being a sovereign EU member state than be a province of Greece.
Its tortuous progress is the result of several factors. One is that, regarding the Cyprus dispute, international law has been unconstructive. Turks, though perhaps conforming to the letter of the law, have insisted on the strictures of ancient documents which go against prevailing norms and command little public support. Greeks, with equal doggedness, have done the opposite: disregarding the letter, they have advocated a wholesale embrace of the lofty principles of self-determination and majority rule, though the very point of the original Cypriot constitution was to limit these for the sake of the unity of the island. Indeed, when these limitations ceased to be observed, the island was split.
Another thing the Cyprus problem demonstrates is the necessity of imagination. Turkish Cypriots might not have insisted so much on separate municipalities had they known it would precipitate a crisis whereafter they would be barred from government; EOKA and Sampson might have not launched a coup had they known it would precipitate in a Turkish invasion, a real one this time; Clerides might have not asked for more time if he had known the Troodos line would fall and the international community would not be able to constrain a further Turkish advance…
The Cyprus problem also demonstrates the need for the alignment of incentives. Denktaş might have been less hardnosed a negotiator[39] if the carrot of European integration had been waived for Turkey or Turkish Cypriots. Greek Cypriots might have been more acquiescent had they known that all the diplomatic condemnation they were able to marshal in the 1980s would not be able to avail them in the end, or if their adhesion to the European Union had been conditioned on the resolution of the Cyprus problem. Turkey might have been more constructive in the 2000s were its European candidacy a more substantial matter.
Such thinking seems to align with that of the head of the government in the south of the island, Nikos Christodoules. In recent interviews, namely with Euronews[40] and the Rest is Politics*[41], he mentioned the importance of offering incentives and the importance of keeping in mind that unresolved conflicts can flare up. One hopes that statesmen, not least Cypriots ones themselves, will be able to avail themselves of the lessons of statecraft to be drawn from an analysis of the Cyprus problem.
[1] Euripides Evriviades, ‘The Eastern Mediterranean: Cyprus and the Geopolitics of Turkish Irredentism’, RUSI-Commentary, accessed 2 November 2025.
[2] James Ker-Lindsay, ‘UNFICYP: a living fossil of the Cold War’, Cyprus Mail, 9 March 2014, accessed 2 November 2025.
[3] TripAdvisor, ‘Cyprus’, accessed 2 November 2025..
[4] Anatol Lieven, ‘Ukraine Can’t Win the War’, Time, 24 February 2024, accessed 2 November 2025.
[5] Bir Kıbrıs Belgeseli: Yeşil Ada Kıbrıs | 1. Bölüm | 1989, YouTube video, uploaded by 32. Gün, accessed 4 November 2025. 26:40-28:00
[6] James Ker-Lindsay, The Cyprus Problem: What Everyone Needs to Know (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2022) pp 17-21.
[8] Bir Kıbrıs Belgeseli: Yeşil Ada Kıbrıs | 1. Bölüm | 1989, YouTube video, uploaded by 32. Gün, accessed 4 November 2025. 21:00-25:00. Averoff describes in an interview his dealings with Zorlu at the UN.
[9] Constitution of the Republic of Cyprus (1960, as amended 2013), The Constitute Project, accessed 4 November 2025.
[10] Treaty of Guarantee, Nicosia, 16 August 1960, UN Peacemaker, accessed 4 November 2025.
[11] Ibid.
[12] Norman Stone draws a parallel between Palestine and Gaza in The Atlantic and its Enemies: a Personal History of the Cold War.
[13] Bir Kıbrıs Belgeseli: Yeşil Ada Kıbrıs | 4. Bölüm | 1989, YouTube Video, uploaded by 32. Gün, accessed 4 November 2025. 3:00.
[14] Ibid. 4:00-5:10.
[15] Ibid.
[16] Ibid. 11:00. In the interview, Turkish Cypriot leader Denktas expresses that he found it unbelievable that someone like Sampson be president.
[17] James Ker-Lindsay, The Cyprus Problem: What Everyone Needs to Know (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2022) p 42.
[18] Norman Stone. Turkey: A Short History. The End of Empire. P. 78. Prof. Stone remarks that Cyprus in the 1970s and Crete around the turn of the century were comparable situations.
[19] Turkish Invasion of Cyprus - Battle Footage Captures First Days of Fighting (1974), YouTube video, uploaded by ITN Archive, accessed November 4 2025.
[20] Bir Kıbrıs Belgeseli: Yeşil Ada Kıbrıs | 5. Bölüm | 1989, YouTube Video, uploaded by 32. Gün, accessed November 4 2025. 5:00.
[21] UN Security Council Resolution 353, adopted 20 July 1974, UN Doc S/RES/353 (1974), UN Digital Library, accessed 4 November 2025.
[22] Andrew Borowiec, Cyprus: A Troubled Island (Westport CT, Greenwood Press, 2000) p 2.
[23] BBC'nin Kıbrıs harekâtıyla ilgili 1975'te hazırladığı program, YouTube video, uploaded by BBC News Türkçe, accessed November 4 2025.
[24] UN General Assembly Resolution 37/253, Question of Cyprus (13 May 1983) A/RES/37/253, accessed 4 November 2025.
[25] Bir Kıbrıs Belgeseli: Yeşil Ada Kıbrıs | 5. Bölüm | 1989, YouTube Video, uploaded by 32. Gün, accessed November 4 2025. 5:00.
[26] UN Security Council Resolution 541, adopted 18 November 1983, UN Doc S/RES/541 (1983), accessed 4 November 2025.
[27] United Nations Security Council Resolution 550, adopted 11 May 1984, UN Doc S/RES/550 (1984), accessed 4 November 2025.
[28] Cyprus | What Do You Want to Know?, YouTube video, uploaded by Prof James Ker-Lindsay, accessed 4 November 2025.
[29] “Spyros Kyprianou – The Players – Divided Island”, Cyprus Mail, accessed 5 November 2025.
[30] Treaty of Guarantee, Nicosia, 16 August 1960, UN Peacemaker, accessed 4 November 2025.
[31] Charter of the United Nations (adopted 26 June 1945, entered into force 24 October 1945) 1 UNTS XVI, accessed 5 November 2025.
[32] Ibid.
[33] Charter of the United Nations (adopted 26 June 1945, entered into force 24 October 1945) 1 UNTS XVI, accessed 5 November 2025.
[34] United Nations, Charter of the United Nations (adopted 26 June 1945, entered into force 24 October 1945) 1 UNTS XVI, arts 24–25, 39–42, accessed 4 November 2025.
[35] Charter of the United Nations (adopted 26 June 1945, entered into force 24 October 1945) 1 UNTS XVI, accessed 5 November 2025. Article 52(1) states:Nothing in the present Charter precludes the existence of regional arrangements or agencies for dealing with such matters relating to the maintenance of international peace and security as are appropriate for regional action provided that such arrangements or agencies and their activities are consistent with the Purposes and Principles of the United Nations.
[36] Ibid.
[37] James Ker-Lindsay and Mikuláš Fábry, Secession and State Creation: What Everyone Needs to Know (Oxford University Press, 2023) ch 3, “Modern Rules: Self-Determination and Decolonization, 1945–1990”.
[38] Accordance with International Law of the Unilateral Declaration of Independence in Respect of Kosovo (Advisory Opinion, ICJ, 22 July 2010) I.C.J. Rep. 403, General List No. 141. apud Chris Borgen, ‘The Kosovo Advisory Opinion, Self Determination, and Secession’ (23 July 2010) Opinio Juris accessed 5 November 2025.“In no case, however, does the practice of States suggest that the act of promulgating the declaration was regarded as contrary to international law. On the contrary, State practice during this period points clearly to the conclusion that international law contained no prohibition of declarations of independence… The practice of States… [in the second half of the twentieth century] does not point to the emergence in international law of a new rule prohibiting the making of a declaration of independence in such cases.” (para. 79)
[39] James Ker-Lindsay, The Cyprus Problem: What Everyone Needs to Know (Oxford University Press, 2011) p 19.
[40] ‘“I’m ready to resume negotiations” – President of Cyprus optimistic about reuniting the island’, Euronews, 22 October 2025, accessed 4 November 2025.
[41] Leading A Country Next To The World's Most Dangerous Region: President of Cyprus, YouTube video, uploaded by The Rest Is Politics: Leading, , accessed 4 November 2025.
[1] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=x2Y-
[2] https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Cyprus_2013?lang=en#
[3] https://peacemaker.un.org/sites/default/files/document/files/2024/05/cy20gr20tr600816treaty20of20guarantee.
[4] https://www.un.org/en/about-us/un-charter/full-
[5] https://www.un.org/en/about-us/un-charter/full-
[6] https://www.un.org/en/about-us/un-charter/full-
